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Abstract 
Procedural fairness (whether the organizational decision-making process is perceived 
as fair) has profound psychological effects on organizational members. A vital reason 
for these effects is that organizational procedures communicate information which is 
relevant to the self. Specifically, this information is relevant to different types of self 
(individual, collective, relational) and, more importantly, to different motives within 
each type of self. As such, procedures satisfy the motives of uncertainty reduction and 
self-enhancement (individual self), the motives of reputation and status (collective 
self), and the motives of belongingness and respect (relational self). We provide 
illustrative evidence in support of our conceptual map, discuss complexities, and offer 
suggestions for future research. 
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The self in procedural fairness 
In the late 1970s, there was a paradigmatic shift in social justice research. 
Until then, empirical efforts had focused on distributive justice (Adams, 1965; 
Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978). This referred to the consequences of the 
decisions that an authority made, with the authority being managerial, educational, 
political, legal, familial, or, generally, a group leader. The consequences (e.g. bonus, 
salary raise, promotion, task assignment, course grade, legal regulations, resource 
allocation) could be regarded as either fair or unfair by members of the group or 
organization. Theory and research by Thibaut and Walker (1975), Deutsch (1979), 
Leventhal (1980), and Tyler and Caine (1981) changed that empirical focus. Their 
work gave rise to the concept of procedural justice or procedural fairness. 
 
Procedural fairness 
Procedural fairness refers to perceptions of the way in which decisions are made in an 
organization. Do authorities use fair procedures when they make decisions on how to 
allocate various outcomes? Do organizational members perceive these procedures as 
fair, regardless of whether they were favored or disadvantaged by the outcomes? In 
other words, do members care about how decisions were made, irrespective of what 
the decisions were? More specifically, do members’ perceptions of procedural 
fairness change the way members feel, think, and behave? 
Procedural fairness or unfairness has been typically operationalized by means 
of decision-making rules such as voice (Folger, 1997) or accuracy (i.e., whether 
information relevant to the decision-making process is used in a correct and valid 
manner; Van den Bos, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1997). In the case of voice (i.e. procedural 
fairness), participants are led to believe that the manager has taken their views 
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seriously into account, and thus their input will shape the organizational decision-
making process. In the case of no-voice (i.e. procedural unfairness), participants are 
led to believe that the manager has not paid attention to their views (i.e., implicit no-
voice) or even rejected their views (i.e., explicit no-voice; Van den Bos, 1999), and 
thus their input will be irrelevant to organizational decisions. Paralleling this pattern, 
in the case of accuracy (i.e. procedural fairness), participants learn that the manager 
assessed accurately or validly their potential; that is, the manager considered carefully 
all of their qualifications when making the decision to hire them or not. In the case of 
inaccuracy (i.e. procedural unfairness), participants learn that the manager assessed 
inaccurately or invalidly their potential; that is, the manager capriciously considered 
only a small subset of their qualifications in the hiring decision. Other and less 
frequent operationalizations of procedural fairness or unfairness involve the 
implementation of two additional fairness criteria. One is consistency and refers to 
whether organizational rules are applied consistently across time and employees. The 
other criterion is correctability and refers to whether organizational members have the 
right to appeal against decisions that they find objectionable (Leventhal, 1980; see 
also Hart, Sedikides, & De Cremer, 2007). 
Perceptions of procedural fairness have profound psychological consequences. 
For example, such perceptions influence members’ emotions and transient mood (Van 
den Bos, 2001), impressions of and compliance with authorities (Lind & Tyler, 1988), 
authority trust and legitimacy (Korsgaard, Schweiger, & Sapienza, 1995), as well as 
intrinsic motivation and creativity (Tyler & Blader, 2000). In addition, procedural 
fairness perceptions influence job satisfaction and well-being (Schmitt & Dörfel, 
1999), organizational citizenship (Moorman, 1991), workplace aggression (Neuman 
& Baron, 2005), revenge (De Cremer, 2006), and employee theft (Greenberg, 1990). 
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Importantly, perceptions of procedural fairness have psychological consequences 
above and beyond concerns for distributive justice (i.e. concerns for material gain or 
outcomes; Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982; Tyler, 1984). 
In all, then, members are more satisfied, think higher of the organization and 
of authorities, and are more likely to remain attached to their organization when they 
regard procedures as fair than unfair. Clearly, procedural fairness is important. But 
why so? 
 
The role of self in procedural fairness 
Why do these psychological consequences occur? What drives these effects? Why do 
people care so much about procedural fairness? 
  In their pioneering work, Thibaut and Walker (1975) reasoned that procedural 
fairness effects are impactful, because they are linked to equitability of resource 
distribution. Fairness of procedures has implications for fairness of outcome 
allocation. To be specific, fair procedures are likely to result in fair decisions or 
outcomes. It is for instrumental reasons, then, that people care so much about 
procedural fairness. 
  In the last 15 years, though, researchers have emphasized another reason why 
procedural fairness matters. This has to do with the interpersonal implications of 
procedures. Procedures—regardless of whether they involve voice, accuracy, 
consistency, or correctability— are conceptualized as social interactions (Skitka, 
2003; Tyler & Blader, 2003). Interpersonal treatment can vary in perceived quality; it 
can be seen as fair or unfair. Procedures, then, matter because of their powerful 
interpersonal component and interpersonal consequences. 
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  What exactly are these consequences and, more specifically, for whom? We 
argue, along with other researchers, that these consequences directly implicate the self 
(Clayton & Opotow, 2003; De Cremer & Tyler, 2005a; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Skitka, 
2003; Tyler & Blader, 2000; Tyler & Lind, 1992; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002). On the 
face of it, perhaps this argument will appear somewhat reductionistic. However, we 
contend that the argument is based on solid rationale and parallels developments in 
the field of social psychology. 
  One rationale for our thesis is that the self is fundamentally social (Andersen, 
Chen, & Miranda, 2002; Forgas, Williams, & Wheeler, 2001; Sedikides, Gregg, & 
Hart, 2007). Social interactions are the medium through which important others shape 
the opinion persons have of themselves (Hoelter, 1984) and the way persons evaluate 
or feel about themselves (Leary, 2006). The self, then, is embedded in social 
interactions or procedures. 
  In addition, the self is embedded in justice concerns (Clayton & Opotow, 
2003; Skitka, 2003). For example, people think spontaneously about justice when they 
imagine that an event has happened to them (e.g. earning less money than a colleague 
for the same job) rather than to someone else (e.g. a third person earning less money 
than a colleague for the same job) (Ham & van den Bos, 2008). Also, heightened 
accessibility of the self (e.g., I, me, myself) predicts stronger retaliatory reactions 
against the source of unfair treatment (e.g. manager; Brebels, De Cremer, & 
Sedikides, in press). Moreover, heightened accessibility of the self predicts strivings 
to restore equity in the case of an undeserving overpayment (Reis & Burns, 1982), 
and it also predicts less cheating (Vallacher & Solodky, 1979) and less stealing 
(Beaman, Klentz, Diener, & Svanum, 1979) 
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  The use of the “self” construct to address why procedures matter accords with 
the social cognition perspective in social psychology. This perspective emphasizes the 
search for constructs that are at the heart of (i.e. mediate or moderate) social 
psychological phenomena (Fiske & Taylor, 2008). We argue that the “self” is such a 
construct. 
  Recent advances, however, indicate that the self is not necessarily a unitary 
construct. At the very least, increased conceptual and empirical clarity will likely be 
attained, if the construct is trichotomized in terms of individual, relational, and 
collective self. We note that these three types of self are partially autonomous but 
highly interactive. We will elaborate on this distinction below. 
 
Individual, collective, and relational self 
The self-concept consists of three fundamental self-representations. These are the 
individual self, collective self, and relational self (Sedikides & Brewer, 2001). Stated 
otherwise, people rely alternately on their unique qualities, group memberships, or 
dyadic relationships in seeking or achieving identity (i.e. self-interpretation). 
  In particular, the individual self contains the unique constellation of 
characteristics that differentiate the person from other persons in his or her own 
group. This form of self-definition is achieved through social comparison processes, 
that is, by comparing oneself with ingroup members (Libby & Eibach, 2007; 
Sedikides & Gaertner, 2001). The collective self consists of characteristics that the 
person shares with members of the group with which he or she identifies (i.e. the 
ingroup). These characteristics differentiate the group member from members of other 
(typically antagonistic) groups (Abrams, Frings, & Randsley de Moura, 2005; Hogg 
& Abrams, 1988). The collective self is based on bonds with ingroup members—
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bonds that are derived from common (and often symbolic) identification with the 
ingroup. These bonds do not require close relationships among group members, and 
they are often impersonal. This self-definition is achieved, at a minimum, through 
assimilation with intragroup processes (Gaertner, Iuzzini, Witt, & Orina, 2006), 
although it can also be achieved through intergroup comparisons. Finally, the 
relational self contains those characteristics that the person shares with important 
relationships partners and define the person’s role in the relationship. The relational 
self is based on attachment bonds (e.g. teacher-student, manager-employee, friend-
friend, parent-child). This self-definition is achieved through the process of reflected 
appraisal, that is, seeing the self in the way that a significant other does (Carmichael, 
Tsai, Smith, Caprariello, & Reis, 2007; Chen, Boucher, & Tapias, 2006; Tice & 
Baumeister, 2001). 
  Procedures convey symbolic messages that have self-relevant implications for 
members. These implications will differ, depending on whether they refer to the 
individual, relational, or collective self. More specifically, these implications will 
differ, depending on whether they satisfy motives that pertain to each type of self. 
  Recent advances in the area of the self have emphasized the motivational 
nature of this construct. The self is not merely a cognitive representation. It is also a 
construct imbued in motivation (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999; 
Chen et al., 2006; Sedikides & Gregg, 2003). Satisfaction of self-motives is often 
achieved through social interaction, or, as the case might be, organizational 
procedures. Our general thesis is that fair (vis a vis unfair) procedures satisfy self-
motives. Next, we turn to an illustrative discussion of which motives are relevant to 
which type of self. 
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Implications of procedural fairness for the individual self 
Unfair procedures threaten the individual self by increasing uncertainty and 
decreasing self-esteem or the integrity of the self-system. Alternatively, procedural 
fairness impacts on the individual self by satisfying two key motives: uncertainty 
reduction and self-enhancement. 
Uncertainty reduction 
Self-uncertainty is an aversive state (Hogg, 2001). It is associated with unpleasant 
feelings and with the perception that life lacks purpose, control, and meaning. Also, 
self-uncertainty is disruptive, as it blocks the ability to make decisions and to act upon 
them (McGregor, 2003). People, then, will be motivated to reduce their uncertainty 
level. They can do so by relying on aspects of their social environment, such as 
variations in organizational procedures. 
  Indeed, research has demonstrated that people use information about 
procedures to reduce their uncertainty (Sedikides, De Cremer, Hart, & Brebels, in 
press). This use is manifested in terms of the sensitivity or disproportionate weight 
given to fairness information. When in a state of uncertainty (vs. certainty), people 
rate fair procedures more favorably and rate unfair procedures more unfavorably (Van 
den Bos & Lind, 2002). In a similar vein, self-uncertain (vs. self-certain) people 
manifest relatively intense affective and behavioral responses to variations in 
procedural fairness. For example, they express more positive affect and are more 
willing to cooperate for the benefit of the group when they regard procedures as fair, 
whereas they express more negative affect and are less willing to cooperate when they 
regard procedures as unfair (De Cremer & Sedikides, 2005). 
Self-enhancement 
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The motive for self-enhancement refers to maintaining or boosting the positivity of 
one’s self-concept, while avoiding or curtailing its negativity (Alicke & Govorun, 
2005; Sedikides & Gregg, 2003). This motive is also crucial in human functioning, as 
it predicts psychological health and resilient coping with adversity (Sedikides & 
Gregg, 2008; Sedikides et al., 2007). Procedural fairness can satisfy the self-
enhancement motive through its effects on self-esteem and self-affirmation. 
  Self-esteem. Perceived violations of procedural fairness have implications for 
self-esteem. For example, participants experience a drop in self-esteem level when an 
authority implements an unfair (rather than fair) procedure (Koper, van Knippenberg, 
Bouhuijs, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1993; Shroth & Shah, 2000). 
  The plot thickens, however, when a researcher considers self-esteem not as a 
dependent variable but as a moderator. How does self-esteem moderate responses to 
procedural fairness? Brockner et al. (1998) reported that participants high (rather than 
low) in trait self-esteem were influenced more strongly by procedural fairness. This 
finding was replicated by Wiesenfeld, Swann, Brockner, and Bartel (2007). In 
contrast, Van den Bos (2001, Experiment 1) reported that participants low (rather than 
high) in state self-esteem reacted more strongly to variations in procedural fairness. In 
a conceptual replication, Vermunt, van Knippenberg, van Knippenberg, and Blaauw 
(2001) found that participants low (rather than high) in state social self-esteem used 
information about organizational procedures to a greater extent than organizational 
rewards in their judgments of fairness of distributed outcomes. Finally, De Cremer 
(2003) showed that participants low (rather than high) in state social self-esteem were 
more sensitive to variations in procedural fairness. In all, it is not clear whether 
procedural fairness impacts more strongly on low as opposed to high self-esteem 
people. A reason for this empirical discrepancy may be that different researchers have 
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implemented different assessments of self-esteem (e.g. trait vs. state; global vs. 
social). Clearly, future research will do well to address this discrepancy.  
  Self-affirmation. Self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988; see also: Sherman & 
Cohen, 2006) proposes that people are motivated to maintain self-integrity. They do 
so by perceiving themselves as moral, competent, and well-adjusted. These global 
perceptions of self-adequacy can shield against threats to specific domains of self-
functioning. Alternatively, perceptions of self-adequacy in one psychological domain 
can make up for threat (e.g. negative feedback) in another. For example, affirming the 
self in one domain (e.g. values) can ward off threat in another domain (e.g. 
incompetence). Thus, self-affirmation lessens the impact of self-threat. Self-
affirmation serves a self-defensive or self-protective function. 
  In a recent line of research, we (Sedikides, Hart, & De Cremer, 2007) 
advocated that procedural fairness has self-affirmatory potential. Procedural fairness 
serves as a buffer against undesirable personal information: It deflects the 
psychological impact of aversive events. Procedural fairness acts essentially as 
explicit (i.e. written) affirmation of one’s own values or important attributes.  
  Two requirements needed to be met for an adequate testing of our hypothesis. 
The first requirement is the presence of an affirming opportunity. Participants ought 
to use this opportunity in order to defend themselves against threat. In our research, 
the affirming opportunity was procedural fairness. The second requirement is the 
presence of psychological threat. In our research (which was based on hypothetical 
vignettes), the threat was in the form of undesirable personal information from the 
perspective of a company employee (e.g. limited earning potential, increased 
commuting time). The dependent measures were attitudes toward the company, 
identification with the company, and commitment to the company. 
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  The findings were consistent with our hypothesis. Despite the personally 
undesirable feedback (i.e. having their particularized earnings severely capped), 
participants in the procedural fairness condition were more favorable toward the 
company, identified more strongly with the company and were more committed to the 
company than participants in the procedural unfairness condition. In addition, these 
results were mediated by state self-esteem. Procedural fairness increased employee 
self-esteem which in turn was partially responsible for the more favorable attitudes, 
the higher identification, and the stronger commitment that employees expressed for 
their company. In all, the findings corroborated the self-affirmatory potential of 
procedural fairness. 
On the interplay between self-uncertainty and self-enhancement 
We have argued that self-uncertain (vs. self-certain) persons rely on organizational 
procedures: They weigh disproportionately, are over-sensitive to, and overreact to 
information, about both fair and unfair procedures. Perhaps self-uncertain persons 
intensify responding to unfair procedures because they consider them personally 
threatening (Van den Bos et al., in press). If so, self-enhancement, and in particular 
self-affirmation, would relax their responsiveness to variations in procedural fairness.  
  We addressed this issue empirically (De Cremer & Sedikides, 2005, Study 6). 
We operationalized self-uncertainty as self-unclarity (i.e. the degree to which one has 
an ill-defined notion of selfhood; Campbell et al., 1996). After assessing self-
uncertainty, we manipulated procedural fairness. Next, we manipulated self-
affirmation. In the self-affirmation condition, participants spent a few minutes listing 
three positive self-attributes. In the control condition, participants spent a few minutes 
listing three features of their immediate physical environment. Finally, we assessed 
behavioral (i.e., cooperative) intentions. We hypothesized that a self-affirmation 
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manipulation would be effective among self-uncertain but not among self-certain 
participants. Having just been self-affirmed, self-uncertain participants would cease 
momentarily to rely on organizational fairness for self-validation and to perceive 
procedural unfairness as self-threatening. These participants would show a 
substantially attenuated reaction to variations in procedural fairness. 
  The results were consistent with the hypothesis. In the absence of self-
affirmation, self-uncertain (compared to self-certain) participants responded more 
strongly to variations in procedural fairness: They were more eager to cooperate when 
procedures were fair, and they were less eager to cooperate when procedures were 
unfair. In the presence of self-affirmation, however, self-uncertain and self-certain 
persons did not differ in their responsiveness to variations in procedural fairness. Put 
somewhat differently, self-affirmation cancelled out the response extremity of self-
uncertain participants. 
 
Implications of procedural fairness for the collective self 
Unfair procedures threaten the collective self by decreasing reputation and status. 
Alternatively, procedural fairness impacts on the collective self by satisfying two key 
motives: the motive for reputation and the motive for status. 
Reputation 
Reputation refers to “the beliefs or opinions that are generally held about someone” 
(The New Oxford Dictionary of English, 1998). As such, reputation is a judgment that 
emerges from the received treatment from others (Emler & Hopkins, 1990; Ferris, 
Blass, Douglas, Kolodinsky, & Treadway, 2003). This judgment is based on others’ 
history of social interaction with the person and summarizes the impressions or 
 
This article may not exactly replicate the final version published in the APA journal. It is not the copy of record. Procedural Fairness 14 
behavioral expectations that others have of the person. Others can communicate this 
judgment to the person directly or indirectly (i.e. as gossip). 
  We (De Cremer & Sedikides, 2008) argued that, in organizational settings, 
information about one’s reputation is provided by the enacting authority (e.g., 
manager, group leader) by means of fairness of treatment. Procedural fairness (e.g. 
opportunity for voice) signals a positive reputation, whereas procedural unfairness 
(e.g. lack of voice) signals a negative reputation. Moreover, variations in procedural 
fairness will have a stronger psychological impact on members who are highly 
concerned about their reputation. Stated otherwise, procedural unfairness will lead to 
a higher self-esteem reduction among positive-reputation members than negative-
reputation members. 
We carried out several studies to test this hypothesis. In Study 1, participants 
who were treated fairly (vs. unfairly) reported that the manager gave their reputation 
serious consideration. This effect was pronounced when fairly-treated participants 
were identifiable to their fellow group members. Thus, Study 1 showed that 
procedures carry reputational implications. Studies 2 and 3 moved away from treating 
reputation as a dependent variable to treating it as a moderator. These studies 
demonstrated that reputational concern moderates the impact of procedural fairness on 
self-esteem. Variations in procedural fairness were more strongly associated with the 
self-esteem of persons high rather than low in concern for reputation. Put otherwise, 
persons high in reputation concern experienced lower self-esteem when treated 
unfairly and higher self-esteem when treated fairly. 
Status 
Status refers to a member’s group standing or, more generally, to relative intragroup 
differences (Cropanzano, Rupp, Mohler, & Schminke, 2001). Status plays a crucial 
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role in organizational settings. In particular, procedural fairness information provides 
diagnostic cues about one’s relative position in the group. By treating a member fairly 
or unfairly, the enacting authority in essence communicates the member’s relative 
group standing (Tyler & Lind, 1992). Empirical evidence has been consistent with the 
argument that procedural fairness information has implication for members’ 
recognition of their status in the group (Tyler, 1989; Tyler & Blader, 2002).  
  Additional research by Van Prooijen, Van den Bos, and Wilke (2002) and by 
Diekmann, Sondak, and Barsness (2007) has suggested a more nuanced relation 
between procedural fairness and status. Van Prooijen et al. hypothesized that, when 
status is accessible in members’ minds, procedural fairness will have a stronger 
psychological impact. In Experiment 1, they manipulated the accessibility of the 
concept of status by asking participants in the experimental group to describe “the 
thoughts and emotions that come to mind when you think of the concept of status” and 
“a situation out of your own life in which status played a role” (p. 1356). In the control 
condition, participants wrote about “watching TV” rather than status. The procedural 
fairness manipulation followed, with half of the participants treated fairly and half 
unfairly. In confirmation of the hypothesis, those participants who (a) had the concept 
of status accessible in their minds and (b) were in the procedural fairness condition 
thought that the experimenter trusted them more and treated them more courteously. 
The results were conceptually replicated in Experiment 2. Finally, in three field studies, 
Diekmann et al. demonstrated that procedural fairness had a stronger influence on the 
job satisfaction ratings of high-status than low-status employees. 
On the interplay between reputation and status 
On the face of it, reputation and status appear to be homologous constructs. Surely, a 
member with a positive reputation must be high in group status, and vice-versa. 
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However, this may not necessarily be the case. It is possible for a member to have a 
positive global reputation regardless of whether this member occupies a relatively 
high or low standing in a specific group. For example, the reputation may be based on 
the member’s conscientiousness, cooperativeness and social skills rather than high 
achievement. A safe conclusion, then, is that reputation and status are overlapping but 
partially autonomous constructs. 
  Indeed, the empirical literature has produced enough inconsistencies to 
warrant an independent treatment of reputation. Research by Van Prooijen, Van den 
Bos, and Wilke (2005) is a case in point. Participants imagined their employee status as 
low, average, high, or unknown. (In the last condition, participants were given no 
information about their employee status). They then learned that organizational 
procedures were either fair or unfair. Subsequently, participants indicated how fair or 
appropriate they regarded the procedures, and how satisfied they were with the 
procedures. Participants whose status was known (rather than unknown) were affected 
more strongly by procedural treatment; that is they regarded fair treatment as more fair 
or appropriate, and they were more satisfied with fair treatment. This finding suggests 
that intragroup status and reputation are convergent constructs: Participants had more to 
lose when their status (or reputation) was known than unknown. Interestingly, however, 
no differences emerged among low, average, and high status employees: These 
participants were equally affected by procedural treatment. This finding suggests that 
status and reputation are divergent constructs. Given this empirical discrepancy, more 
research is needed into the unique implications of procedural fairness for status and 
reputation. 
 
Implications of procedural fairness for the relational self 
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Unfair procedures threaten the relational self by decreasing belongingness and 
respect. Alternatively, procedural fairness impacts on the collective self by satisfying 
two key motives: the motive for belongingness and the motive for respect. 
Belongingness 
People are motivated to gain acceptance by others and avoid rejection from them 
(Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Being excluded causes distress, pain, sadness, and anger 
(Williams, Forgas, & von Hippel, 2005), even when the excluding agency is despised 
(Gonsalkorale & Williams, 2007). 
  Procedural fairness satisfies the belongingness motive. Fair procedures are 
assumed to signal the symbolic message that one is accepted (Lind & Tyler, 1988; 
Thau, Aquino, & Poortvliet, 2007). Illustrative evidence for this assertion was 
provided by De Cremer and Blader (2006, Study 1). These investigators tested the 
idea that differences in the need to belong moderate people’s reactions (i.e. self-
evaluations and emotions) to variations in procedural fairness. They first assessed 
participants’ need to belong and then manipulated procedural fairness. As 
hypothesized, emotions and self-evaluations fluctuated as a function of procedure -
that is, participants reported more negative affect (i.e. anger, disappointment) and 
more negative self-evaluations (i.e., incompetence, dissatisfaction with self) in the 
case of unfair than fair treatment. However, this pattern was pronounced among 
participants who were high in need to belong. 
  De Cremer and Blader (2006, Study 3) further hypothesized that persons high 
in need to belong would be more careful, vigilant, or systematic processors of 
procedural fairness information, given that such information would be directly 
relevant to their concerns for relational acceptance. Furthermore, compelling (as 
opposed to poor) reasons for why the manager instituted fair procedures would 
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require more careful, vigilant, or systematic processing. First, De Cremer and Blader 
assessed the need to belong. Then they provided participants with either compelling 
or poor reasons for why the manager would give them the opportunity of voice in the 
organizational decision-making. The compelling reasons included “the manager 
believes in democratic values indicating to people that they are important and 
valuable,” whereas the poor reasons included “the manager once heard about giving 
voice opportunities and thought it was a fun idea” (p. 222). As hypothesized, 
participants’ reactions (e.g. the extent to which participants judged procedures as fair 
and the manager as trustworthy) were influenced more strongly by compelling than 
poor reasons. This pattern, however, was more pronounced among participants who 
were high in need to belong. 
Respect 
Respect has been defined as “something to which we should presume every human 
being has a claim, namely full recognition as a person, with same basic moral worth 
as any other” (Hill, 2000, p. 59). Indeed, respect has been acknowledged not only as a 
relational-self motive (Frei & Shaver, 2002), but also as an interpersonal moral duty 
(Hill, 2000). 
  Receiving respect is regarded as an essential element of social justice. As 
Miller (2001) put it, “justice and respect are powerfully and inseparably linked” (p. 
545). Several empirical investigations illustrate the importance of the link between 
respect and justice. For example, research on interactional justice shows that people 
perceive a lack of respectful treatment as unfair (Bies, 2001). Also, people react 
strongly and negatively to perceptions of disrespect in legal or political settings (Tyler 
& Huo, 2002), as well as in organizational settings (Tyler & Blader, 2000). Finally, 
respectful versus disrespectful treatment by other group members (communicated via 
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fair vs. unfair procedures) influences strongly people’s emotions, self-worth, and 
behavior (De Cremer & Tyler, 2005b).     
On the interplay between belongingness and respect 
The relation between belongingness and respect was illustrated by De Cremer and 
Tyler (2005b). Participants were first classified as relatively high or low in need to 
belong. Subsequently, participants worked on a laboratory task and received feedback 
that either signalled respect or disrespect from other members of the group. Finally, 
participants indicated whether they wished to leave the group. Participants who were 
high (but now low) in need to belong expressed the intention to leave the group when 
they were disrespected rather than respected. This finding indicates interactive effects 
of belongingness and respect on human behavior. 
  Nevertheless, other findings present a more complicated picture of the relation 
between these two constructs. Simon and Stuermer (2005) tested whether respect is 
the result of acceptance by others. They manipulated the extent to which one was 
respected or disrespected by group members, and they also manipulated the extent to 
which one was accepted or rejected by group members. The dependent measures were 
willingness to cooperate with the group and identification with the group. Respected 
(compared to disrespected) were more willing to cooperate with the group and 
identified more strongly with the group. Accepted (compared to rejected) members 
identified more strongly with the ingroup, but were no more willing to cooperate with 
the group. More relevantly for the purposes of this article, the two factors did not 
interact on either dependent measure. In addition, acceptance did not mediate respect. 
This finding calls for additional research into the different ways in which 
belongingness and respect influence behavior in a justice context. 
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Concluding Statements 
Procedural fairness, the extent to which people perceive that they are treated fairly or 
unfairly in a group or organizational setting, has remarkable effects on thinking, 
feeling, and behaving. A vital reason for these effects is the self: organizational 
procedures are important, because they are relevant to the self. Not only is the self 
inherently social, but it is also embedded in justice concerns. In addition, 
organizational procedures communicate symbolic information that is useful to the 
self-system. This information can pertain to the individual self (identity derived from 
one’s unique qualities), the collective self (identity derived from one’s group 
memberships), or the relational self (identity derived from one’s important 
relationships). 
  The implications of organizational procedures will differ, depending on which 
type of self they pertain. Unfair procedures present a different type of threat for each 
self. Such procedures threaten self-esteem and self-integrity (individual self), 
certainty and status (collective self), and belongingness and respect (relational self). 
Stated somewhat differently, fair procedures satisfy different motives for each type of 
self. We argued that (a) procedures involving the individual self satisfy (at least) the 
motives of uncertainty reduction and self-enhancement; (b) procedures involving the 
collective self satisfy (at least) the motives of reputation and status; and (c) 
procedures involving the relational self satisfy (at least) the motives of belongingness 
and respect. This argument advocates the view that both self and responses to 
procedural fairness are imbued in motivation. Indeed, recent advances from 
neuroimaging techniques have provided evidence that perceived fairness is 
hedonically valued. For example, fair (compared to unfair) treatment leads to 
activation in reward brain regions (Tabibnia, Satpute, & Lieberman, 2008). 
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  However, we did not intend to confound the implications of procedural 
fairness for motives within each type of self. As such, we acknowledged by 
presenting illustrative evidence that procedures may have distinct implications for the 
individual-self motives (uncertainty reduction versus self-enhancement), the 
collective-self motives (reputation versus status), and the relational-self motives 
(belongingness versus respect). An agenda for future research would be further to 
clarify the distinctiveness of these implications for each within-self motive. 
  Clarification of the unique implications of procedures for each type of self 
would be facilitated if a crucial dependent variable, self-esteem, were to be adapted in 
accordance with the type of self implemented in a given study. Thus, individual self-
esteem (Rosenberg, 1965) would need to be measured in the case of the individual 
self, relational self-esteem would need to be measured in the case of the relational self 
(Chen et al., 2006), and collective self-esteem would need to be measured in the case 
of the collective self (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992). 
  At the same time, though, we would like to acknowledge the potential for 
crossover of motives among different types of self. For example, by providing a sense 
of belongingness and respect, procedural fairness may also reduce uncertainty as well 
as enhance status. Alternatively, by increasing self-esteem and affirming the self, 
procedural fairness may elevate reputation while reducing uncertainty. Although 
forays into this research direction have been made (e.g. De Cremer & Tyler, 2005a,b; 
Van den Bos, 2007), additional research is needed. 
  In conclusion, we attempted to provide a conceptual map, accompanied by 
empirical illustration, on how procedures speak directly to (a) the three types of self—
individual, collective, and relational, and (b) the different motives within each self— 
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uncertainty reduction and self-enhancement for individual self; reputation and status 
for the collective self; belongingness and respect for the relational self. We hope that 
our analysis goes some way in adding clarity to the existing literature and in pointing 
to future research directions. 
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